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NOTES
SLAMMING THE LID ON PANDORA'S
Box: HOW THE OHIO LEGISLATURE
COMPENSATED THE INSURANCE
INDUSTRY FOR SCOTT-PONTZER AT
THE EXPENSE OF OHIO'S DRIVERS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Potential Impact of Ohio's New Uninsured Motorist Law
(S.B. 97)
Imagine that you are seriously injured in a car accident caused by a
drunk driver. You have always driven carefully, never received a
traffic ticket, and never before been involved in a car accident. Be-
cause you are a prudent driver, you carry what you believe to be full
coverage automobile insurance sufficient to protect you, your family,
and your property. After you return home from the hospital, the po-
lice inform you that the drunk driver who hit you did not have auto-
mobile insurance and is indigent.
You then contact your insurance carrier who informs you that, al-
though you have significant liability insurance, the coverage does not
apply to bodily injuries caused by uninsured motorists. In order to
recover for your bodily injuries, you would require uninsured motor-
ist insurance ("UM"). Before you can ask, your agent informs you
that your policy does not contain UM. You think back and cannot
recall being offered UM but are sure that you asked for "full protec-
tion." You ask the agent why you were not offered this coverage.
She informs you that, in the past, the law required insurers to make a
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meaningful offer of UM to every person purchasing automobile in-
surance.' Every automobile insurance policy automatically included
the coverage unless rejected in writing by the insured.2
The law was stringent, she explains. If the insurer failed to make
this meaningful offer or obtain a written rejection, the courts would
create the coverage as a matter of law even though the customer paid
nothing for the additional coverage. 3 She regretfully informs you that
the law has changed, no longer requiring insurance companies to offer
UM.4 Displeased with the high transaction costs, low earnings, un-
predictable judicial treatment, and overall concept of UM, 5 your in-
surer chose to discontinue offering the coverage.
You are incredulous. You purchased all the automobile insurance
that was made available to you. You were injured in an accident that
was not your fault. And now you are unable to recover any compen-
sation for damages 6 resulting from your bodily injuries. You wonder
how your government could have allowed this to happen. After some
inquiries, you are extremely disappointed to learn that your state gov-
ernment not only acquiesced, but encouraged it through legislation
claiming a benefit to Ohio drivers by "[p]rotect[ing] and preserv[ing]
stable markets and reasonable rates for automobile insurance for Ohio
consumers."
7
I Linko v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 739 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ohio 2000); see S.B. 267, 123d
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000).
2 Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Ohio 1996).
3 Abate v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 258 N.E.2d 429,431 (Ohio 1970).
4 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (West Supp. 2004).
5 Insurers are uncomfortable with the manner in which UM pits them against their cus-
tomers-those insured. Initially, the insurer sides with the uninsured tortfeasor against the
insured. The insurer stands in the shoes of the uninsured motorist and may assert any defense
that the uninsured could assert against the insured. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boynton, 486 So. 2d
552, 557 (Fla. 1986); see also Sweeney v. Grange Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 766 N.E.2d 212, 215
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (reciting clause in automobile insurance policy that provides insurer with
the right to defend the uninsured motorist on the issue of legal liability and damages); ALAN I.
WIDISS, A GuIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 7.2, at 254 (1969) (remarking that the
insured generally defends by showing that the UM was not negligent or that the insured was
negligent).
If the insurer and tortfeasor fail in this endeavor, the insurer becomes a turncoat and
sides with its insured against the tortfeasor. If the insurer and its insured successfully establish
the tortfeasor's liability, the insurer will pay the insured as appropriate under the UM policy.
The insurer then subrogates against the tortfeasor, the party with whom the insurer was previ-
ously aligned, to attempt to recover the funds distributed to the insured. See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3937.18(J) (West Supp. 2004) (providing insurers with a statutory right to subrogate).
6 These damages usually include pain and suffering, medical payments, and lost wages.
However, because many people carry some sort of medical or disability insurance, the main
compensation that UM provides is for pain and suffering. See Gary T. Schwartz, A Proposal for
Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist Plans, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 427 (1987) (not-
ing that UM primarily covers pain and suffering).
7 S.B. 97, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
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The Ohio General Assembly eliminated the UM offer requirement
from the statute in response to soaring premiums for commercial
automobile and general liability insurance policies. 8 You are puzzled.
Why would the legislative changes affect individual automobile poli-
cies when the impetus for these changes occurred only in the com-
mercial realm? While the commercial insurance rates were skyrock-
eting, the individual rates in Ohio experienced increases that were on
par with the rest of the U.S.9 Your skepticism further increases after
learning that Ohio drivers have continued to enjoy premiums below
the national average.' 0 So what were the real reasons Ohio legislators
eliminated the requirement that insurers offer UM by enacting Senate
Bill 97 ("S.B. 97")?"
B. The Problem with S.B. 97
The purposes of the Ohio General Assembly in enacting S.B. 97
would have been better stated: Protecting and preserving stable mar-
kets and reasonable rates for automobile insurance for Ohio's com-
mercial consumers. 12 As this Note will show, S.B. 97 only benefited
the insurance industry and its commercial customers. Huge premium
increases for commercial automobile, general liability, and um-
brella/excess insurance policies prompted S.B. 97.13
These premium increases were the direct result of a controversial
Ohio Supreme Court decision, 14 Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mutual Fire
Insurance Co.,' 5 that imposed UM where neither the insurance pro-
vider nor the policyholder contemplated coverage. The Scott-Pontzer
court held that an off-duty employee of a company could be an "in-
sured" under the company's commercial general liability insurance
policy by construing the ambiguous language of the policy against the
insurer.1 6 Next, the court found that this commercial liability policy,
8 Second Hearing on S.B. 97 Before S. Comm. on Ins., Commerce and Labor, 124th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001) [hereinafter Bill History]; see also Julie Can" Smyth, Bill
Would Free Auto Insurers of Court-Determined Liability, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH),
June 29, 2001, Metro Section, at 7, available at 2001 WLNR 243841.
9 Insurance Information Institute, Facts and Statistics, Auto Insurance, at
http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/auto (last visited Apr. 27, 2005). Between 1999 and
2001, Ohio's individual rates increased by only 6.2%. See id. Between 1998 and 2001, Ohio's
rankings among the states changed by only two spots from 37th to 35th highest. See id.
10 See id. In 2001, the average expenditure in Ohio for individual auto insurance was
$613.75 per year. By comparison, the national average was $719.75 per year. Id.
11 S.B. 97, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
12 See sources cited supra note 8.
13 See sources cited supra note 8.
14 See sources cited supra note 8.
15 710 N.E.2d 1116 (Ohio 1999), overruled in part by Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797
N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio 2003); see discussion infra Part III.B.
16 Scott-Pontzer, 710 N.E.2d at 1119.
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which was intended to protect the company's assets, provided suffi-
cient automobile coverage to require an offer of UM pursuant to
Ohio's UM law, section 3937.18.7 The insurer failed to offer UM
since it did not consider the commercial policy to be a motor vehicle
policy.' 8 The courts implied UM as a matter of law' 9 at the full liabil-
ity limits of the policy.2z
One can imagine the costly effects this decision had upon the in-
surance industry and, consequently, its commercial customers who
paid the ultimate price with premium increases. Since many of these
commercial policies were issued with limits in the millions of dol-
lars,2' the insurers suffered great financial losses when faced with
22
severely injured insureds with claims dating back fifteen years, es-
pecially when the insurers failed to account for this additional risk in
their premium calculations. The huge premium increases were likely
a response to the additional risk associated with the liberal anti-
insurance court and were a means for recouping losses sure to follow
from future lawsuits based on commercial policies issued prior to
Scott-Pontzer.
23
To avoid the costly effect of UM imposed as a matter of law, S.B.
97 completely eliminated the requirement that insurers offer UM.
4
By doing so, the Ohio General Assembly has effectively cut the
courts off at the pass. By making the offer completely optional, the
Ohio General Assembly essentially forecloses the court from imply-
ing UM as a matter of law into any insurance policy. Now, when an
insurer fails to offer UM, it is not an offense punishable by implied
UM; it is simply the insurer exercising its statutorily empowered dis-
cretion.
UM is vital insurance coverage. It assures at least a modicum of
relief for those innocent drivers tragically injured by irresponsible
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1120.
19 Implying UM as a matter of law for failure by an insurer to offer UM or to obtain a
valid rejection from the insured is a standard response by courts of most states. See I ALAN I.
WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 2.7 (2d ed. rev. 1999). It is
viewed as the only proper remedy to correct the insured's error. See Abate v. Pioneer Mut. Cas.
Co., 258 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ohio 1970).
20 Scott-Pontzer, 710 N.E.2d at 1120.
21 See, e.g., Lawler v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 900, 902 (6th Cir. 2003) (com-
mercial employer had business auto policy limit of $2 million and umbrella liability policy limit
of $10 million).
22 Ohio courts classified these Scott-Pontzer claims as contractual, resulting in a fifteen-
year statute of limitations. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
23 Scott-Pontzer only affected policies that were issued prior to its holding. After Scott-
Pontzer, the industry quickly responded by modifying their policies to place them beyond the
reach of Scott-Pontzer. See infra notes 111, 130-132 and accompanying text.
24 S.B. 97, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
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drivers. The need for it is even more critical in a state like Ohio
whose insurance scheme provides no other paths of recovery for these
innocent victims. 25 Legislation in forty-eight states requiring a man-
datory offer or inclusion of UM with every automobile insurance pol-
icy demonstrates the importance of UM and highlights the anomalous
and precipitous nature of Ohio's approach.26
There are three potentially damaging approaches insurers might
take under S.B. 97. In order of increasing severity of harm, they are:
(1) making a less-than-meaningful offer of UM; 27 (2) making UM
available only upon request with no offer; or (3) refusing to provide
UM even when requested by the insured. All three approaches ulti-
mately result in less drivers carrying UM. This will increase the
number of drivers who will be forced to individually bear the burden
of uninsured drivers. This is a far less desirable approach to that
taken by most other states-preferring that the insurance companies
spread the cost among all insured drivers through premiums. This
represents a significant step backwards and a cost to Ohio citizens
that greatly outweighs the purported benefits derived from S.B. 97.
While it was necessary to address the Scott-Pontzer decision, it
was not the legislature that needed to respond. Since insurers had
changed their policy language to negate the effect of Scott-Pontzer2 8
and courts had limited Scott-Pontzer's applicability,29 prospective
legislative change was unnecessary. Furthermore, there were less
drastic approaches that the legislature could have taken to simultane-
ously protect commercial interests and Ohio's drivers.
25 See Abate v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 258 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ohio 1970) (recognizing that
Ohio mandates the UM offer to protect persons who would otherwise go uncompensated).
Many of the states requiring that insurers offer UM also provide alternate paths of recovery for
victims of uninsured motorists, such as no-fault and unsatisfied judgment funds. See infra notes
53, 208-212 and accompanying text; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34M (West
1998) (requiring no-fault insurance in addition to requiring UM in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
175, § i13L (West 1998)); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61 to -90.1, 39:6A-4 (West Supp. 2003)
(establishing an unsatisfied judgment fund and requiring no-fault insurance, respectively, in
addition to requiring UM in section 17:28-1.1).
26 See 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, §§ 2.1-2.6 (confirming that in 1999 all of the states except
for Michigan had a mandatory offer requirement); see infra Appendix (listing each state's UM
laws). Michigan repealed its UM law in 1973 when it enacted a comprehensive no-fault system
that adequately protects drivers from uninsured motorists. I WIDISS, supra note 19, §§ 2.1-2.6.
27 A "less-than-meaningful" offer of UM would be an offer by the insurer that fails to
adequately inform the insured of the importance of UM and fails to warn the insured of the
dangers and risks of driving without UM coverage-in other words, an offer that does not
comply with the requirements of a meaningful offer as stated in Linko v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 739
N.E.2d 338 (Ohio 2000). See infra Part nI.C.
28 Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1277 (Ohio 2003) (Pfeifer, J.,
dissenting).
29 See infra text accompanying notes 134-38.
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This Note is not only a criticism of the actions taken by the Ohio
General Assembly when it enacted S.B. 97, but it is more importantly
a recommendation for legislative change. On November 5, 2003, the
Supreme Court of Ohio expressly overruled Scott-Pontzer.30 Simply
stated, with the overruling of Scott-Pontzer, the changes brought
about with S.B. 97 are no longer necessary. The legislature should
simply reenact the pre-S.B. 97 language of section 3937.18.
This Note begins by explaining the birth of UM in the U.S. This is
important in order to understand why insurers are statutorily required
to play a role in protecting drivers from uninsured motorists. Next,
this Note explains the cases in Ohio that led to S.B. 97. Understand-
ing what led to S.B. 97 is helpful in understanding what alternate so-
lutions were available to the Ohio General Assembly for dealing with
the insurance "crisis." Then, this Note explains how the legislature
could have used more finely tailored drafting to adequately protect all
the interests at stake. Finally, this Note explores the other protections
the legislature could have implemented to counterbalance the loss in
protection that Ohio drivers suffered with the enactment of S.B. 97.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UM: "CLOSING THE GAP"
Due in large part to the efforts of Henry Ford and his Ford Motor
Company, automobiles became affordable for people of average and
lower income in the early part of the twentieth century. The down-
side to the innovations and associated reduction in the price of auto-
mobiles was that some drivers could afford to purchase automobiles,
but could not afford the potential liability associated with ownership.
To ensure that those who drove on the roads could cover the cost of
injuries and property damage, at least to a minimum degree, caused
by their negligent driving, states began enacting financial responsibil-
ity laws. These laws required that drivers involved in accidents show
proof of financial responsibility. 3' If the driver was unable to do so,
the state suspended his or her driving privileges until he or she could
produce the proof.32 This was an imperfect system since it acted only
after an accident occurred and did nothing to protect or compensate
the person already injured.33
30 Galatis, 797 N.E.2d at 1256.
31 Financial responsibility laws generally require proof of insurance, a government de-
posit, or a bond. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.45 (West Supp. 2004).
32 E.g., Duffey v. Dollison, 734 F.2d 265, 268-69 (6th Cir. 1984) (evaluating Ohio's for-
mer Financial Responsibility Act).
33 Robert G. Notman, A Decennial Study of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 43
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 6 (1967) (comparing proof of financial responsibility laws to the first bite
doctrine in dog bite cases); see also Duffey, 734 F.2d at 269 (commenting that Ohio's former
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The widespread use of UM began in New York. In 1929, New
York enacted a Safety-Responsibility Law.34 Under this law, the state
suspended the driving privileges of motorists who were unable to
satisfy judgments rendered against them for injury and damages
caused by their driving until they could satisfy the judgments.35 This
was refined in 1942 with the "security-type" law. This form of the
Safety-Responsibility Law required that the driver show proof of fi-
nancial responsibility with the reporting of an accident.36 Failure to
do so resulted in a suspension of driving privileges. 37 The "security-
type" law had a profound deterrent effect on the number of uninsured
motorists driving in New York. During the nine years following the
enactment of this law, the number of uninsured drivers declined from
70% to 5%.38 However, these laws had weaknesses. First, as Senator
Hults argued before the New York Senate:
[the Safety-Responsibility Law] does not require a motorist to
carry insurance prior to an accident; it is of little comfort to
the injured victim that the guilty driver loses his driving privi-
lege; and the law is frequently evaded by the guilty driver ob-
taining a release which does not truly reflect the extent of the
injury. Further, the (Joint Legislative) Committee holds that
the fact that the Bureau of Motor Vehicles was required to is-
sue approximately 10,000 suspensions in 1952 indicated a
weakness in the law.
39
In 1952, there still remained between 4-10% uninsured motorists
residing in New York, plus many other out-of-state uninsured drivers
who were injuring innocent New York drivers. 40 New York's Gover-
nor Dewey sought greater protection for New York drivers. His ef-
forts to further reduce the level of uncompensated damages caused by
these uninsured motorists were referred to as "closing the gap."'4' He
stated:
Financial Responsibility Act "embodie[d] a 'one-bite' approach... by permitting motorists the
privilege of driving without any proof of financial responsibility until they incur an accident-
related judgment and fail to satisfy it").
14 Ross D. Netherton & Frederick N. Nabhan, The New York Motorist Vehicle Financial
Security Act of 1956, 5 AM. U. L. REV. 37, 37 (1956).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 38.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 44 (citing a 1953 press release by Senator William Hults, Jr.).
40 Id. at 38.
41 Id.
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I believe the time has come to challenge the right to drive of
that small minority who continue to operate vehicles without
insurance or other evidence of ability to recompense the vic-
tims of their accidents. This is not a new departure. Under
our Safety Responsibility Law, drivers who are involved in
accidents must maintain proof of insurance or financial re-
sponsibility. The present law does not begin to operate, how-
ever, until after the damage is done and victims may be dead
or permanently incapacitated.
The objections that have been raised to a mandatory insur-
ance program can easily be overcome through a well-drafted
law and sound administration. There is no necessity for the
creation of a state fund as part of a mandatory insurance pro-
gram ....
.... What is required is the willingness and determination
to devise a system which will eliminate the irresponsible mo-
torist from the highways and maintain the integrity of the in-
surance companies doing business in this state. I am unwill-
ing to believe that we lack the resourcefulness or integrity to
solve the administrative problems.42
The Dewey Administration pushed for a compulsory insurance pro-
gram similar to that in Massachusetts, modified to address the con-
cerns of the opposition or, in the alternative, a state-operated unsatis-
fied judgment fund.43
The insurance industry strongly opposed the compulsory insurance
plan.44 This seems counterintuitive. A scholar described the indus-
try's peculiar opposition as "the voice of the insurance
[industry] ...quixotically defending the right of people not to buy
insurance.45 Why would a commercial enterprise oppose the gov-
ernment-mandated purchase of its product or service? One reason
was that the industry believed if states required all drivers to buy in-
42 Joseph P. Murphy & Ross D. Netherton, Public Responsibility and the Uninsured Mo-
torist, 47 GEO. L.J. 700, 708 (1959) (quoting N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1953, at 21).
43 See Netherton & Nabhan, supra note 34, at 39-40; see infra note 53 (describing the
judgment fund).
44 See C.D. McVay, The Case Against Compulsory Automobile Insurance, 15 OHIO ST.
L.J. 150 (1954).
45 ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM 92 (1965) (quoting Kalven, Compulsory Automobile Insurance, CHICAGO SUN TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1957).
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surance, its customers would view it as a tax and the insurers as tax
collectors.4 6  The industry believed this would instill a sense of re-
sentment and suspicion against it and could change the entire way the
insurance industry operated. 4' The industry also made altruistic ar-
guments that compulsory insurance was an inadequate solution. It
argued that the law would only govern New Yorkers and, therefore,
did not account for out-of-state drivers and did not protect New York-
ers traveling out-of-state.48 It also argued that people would drive
more recklessly and lawlessly with liability protection.4 9
Ultimately, though, the insurance industry was concerned that it
would lose money in New York as it had in Massachusetts. The in-
surers claimed to have lost $25 million over a six-year period in Mas-
sachusetts because of the compulsory liability insurance law.50  The
industry was also opposed to government control5 1 and the state forc-
ing it to insure those it did not wish to insure. 2 The industry did not
want to bear the burden of injuries caused by poor and dangerous
drivers.
The legislative committees and insurers could not agree on how
best to address the gap problem. Strong disagreements marked their
discussions. Some supported the Massachusetts compulsory plan,
others supported a government fund similar to New Jersey's plan, 5
and still others argued for an impoundment plan.54 In 1954, when the
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See Raymond N. Caverly, New Provisions for Protection from Injuries Inflicted by an
Uninsured Motorist, 396 INS. L.J. 19, 20 (1956).
49 See McVay, supra note 44, at 151. But see Robert S. Marx, Reply to "The Case
Against Compulsory Automobile Compensation Insurance," 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 157, 157-158
(1954) (indicating that Massachusetts achieved a lower injury and death rate under a compul-
sory insurance plan than comparable states with voluntary programs).
50 KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 45, at 93 (citing Am. Employers' Ins. Co. v.
Comm'r of Ins., 142 N.E.2d 341 (Mass. 1957)). These losses are deceiving, however, when
offset with profits earned from other forms of automobile insurance. For example, although
insurers lost $3.5 million on compulsory liability insurance in Massachusetts in 1962, profits
from other coverages resulted in a net profit of $9.1 million for that year. Id. at 94.
51 Paul W. Pretzel, Uninsured Motorist: Uneasy Money-Unless Modified, 515 INS. L.J.
711 (1965).
52 The industry enjoyed the freedom of choosing whom to insure. It preferred not insuring
dangerous drivers with high accident rates or poor drivers who may be unable to make premium
payments.
53 These government funds, sometimes called "Unsatisfied Judgment Funds," are funded
by car owners. The fees are collected with annual automobile license registration. The fund
provides a pool of money to provide compensation to injured persons who would otherwise go
without relief. Ross D. Netherton, Compensation ofAutomobile Accident Victims, Part 1, 2 AM.
U. INT. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1952-1953).
54 Under an impoundment plan, if a driver involved in an accident cannot show proof of
insurance, his car is impounded until: (a) he can produce security sufficient to satisfy any judg-
ment resulting from the accident; (b) six months have passed without any action filed against
him from the accident; or (c) the driver shows proof that a suit had been filed and terminated in
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reconvening legislature reintroduced the issue, the insurers sensed the
issue was not going away.55  In a last-ditch effort to avoid compul-
sory liability insurance, the insurance industry created and offered
what it termed a "voluntary plan," what we today call uninsured mo-
torist insurance.56 While insurers offered UM as an alternative to
compulsory insurance,57 the New York legislature shocked the insur-
ance industry by deciding that both UM and compulsory liability in-
surance were necessary to adequately protect drivers. In 1956, Gov-
ernor Dewey's successor, Governor Harriman, signed the Compul-
sory Insurance Act notwithstanding that insurers offered UM as a
concession. 58 As one insurer expressed the purported betrayal: "To
the everlasting shame of political machinations, the public welfare
was disregarded and a compulsory plan was enacted into law in [New
York]."
Compulsory automobile insurance coupled with UM was effective,
providing a fair and proper method for distributing the burden of un-
insured motorists among their victims, drivers, and the insurance in-
dustry. New Hampshire, in 1957, was the first state requiring every
auto insurance policy to include UM. 60  Soon after, the rest of the
states followed suit.6' While some states require UM inclusion in
every automobile insurance policy, others allow the insured to reject
the coverage.62 Today, every state except Michigan and Ohio require
that insurers offer or include UM with every automobile insurance
policy issued.63
Future developments of uninsured motorist coverage led to under-
insured motorist coverage. This type of insurance applies when the
limits of coverage available for payment to the insured are below the
limits of the insured's UM. Underinsured coverage pays the differ-
ence between the underinsured motorist's liability limits and the in-
his favor or to the satisfaction of the other party. Id. at 20.
55 Netherton & Nabhan, supra note 34, at 46.
56 See Henry S. Moser, The Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 406 INS. L.J. 719, 719
(1956).
57 WIDISS, supra note 5, § 1.12, at 16 ("The insurance industry conceived and developed
the uninsured motorist endorsement in an attempt to forestall the enactment of ... compulsory
insurance .. "); Schwartz, supra note 6, at 422 (observing that UM was offered by the insurers
in an effort to stave off the adoption of compulsory insurance).
58 Netherton & Nabhan, supra note 34, at 51.
59 Moser, supra note 56, at 720.
60 Harry Edgar Rice ll, Uninsured Motorist Insurance: California's Latest Answer to the
Problem of the Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 48 CAL. L. REV. 516, 517 (1960).
61 See Notman, supra note 33, at 6.
62 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 2.5.
63 See supra note 26.
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sured's UM limits. 64 This corrected the irony that an insured could
recover more if an uninsured driver hit him rather than a minimally
insured driver.65 For ease of discussion, this Note refers to both un-
derinsured and uninsured motorist coverage as UM. 6 6
HI. THE IMPETUS OF S.B. 97
Before S.B. 97, Ohio's UM statute read:
3937.18 Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage
(A) No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy
of insurance insuring against loss resulting from liability im-
posed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any per-
son arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a
motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this
state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or princi-
pally garaged in this state unless both of the following cover-
ages are offered to persons insured under the policy due to
bodily injury or death suffered by such insureds:
(1) Uninsured motorist coverage, which shall be in an
amount of coverage equivalent to the automobile liability or
motor vehicle liability coverage and shall provide protection
for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death under
provisions approved by the superintendent of insurance, for
the protection of insureds thereunder who are legally entitled
to recover from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehi-
cles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including
death, suffered by any person insured under the policy.... 67
64 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(C) (West Supp. 2004).
65 Merkel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 693 A.2d 706, 708 (Vt. 1997); see also State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 295 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (explaining how this "ano-
molous situation" prompted legislative change).
66 Arguably underinsured and uninsured coverage are the same coverage.
"[U]nderinsured motorist coverage is simply a different point on an undivided continuum be-
tween the amount of the insured's own liability coverage and any lesser amount of coverage of
the other driver." Merkel, 693 A.2d at 708; see also MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-509 (2002)
(using "uninsured" to encompass both uninsured and underinsured); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
48.22.030 (West Supp. 2005) (using "underinsured" to refer to both).
67 S.B. 267, 123d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000) (emphasis added).
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A. Selander: Some Commercial General Liability Policies Require
UM Offers
Coupling financial responsibility laws with UM worked well
enough in Ohio until the Ohio Supreme Court began a liberal expan-
sion of UM to limits never imagined by the insurance providers, in-
surance customers, or legislature. The expansion began with Se-
lander v. Erie Ins. Group. 68 Two brothers, Eugene and Glenn Se-
lander, were electricians and partners at Twin Electric.69 In 1992, the
two were traveling in a Twin Electric pickup in the course and scope
of employment when they were involved in a car accident with David
Clark.70 The accident was caused by the negligence of Mr. Clark.7
As a result of the accident, Eugene lost his life, and Glenn suffered
serious injuries.72 After collecting a combined sum exceeding
$500,000, 73 the Selanders' clever attorney argued that the commercial
general liability policy held by Twin Electric was an automobile or
motor vehicle liability policy within the meaning of section
3937.18.7
Prior to S.B. 97, establishing that a commercial general liability or
umbrella insurance policy is a motor vehicle policy within the mean-
ing of section 3937.18 was a linchpin in a plaintiff's case in the UM
setting. Once established, courts provided UM by operation of law in
an amount equal to the liability limits, unless it could be shown that
the insured received a meaningful offer and gave express, written
rejection of UM.75 Insurers rarely made the proper offer or received
the proper rejection of UM. 76 For this reason, most commercial in-
surance policies issued prior to Selander found to be motor vehicle
policies were likely to have UM implied by operation of law.77
68 709 N.E.2d 1161 (Ohio 1999).
69 Id. at 1162.
70 Id. at 1161.
7[ Id.
72 Id.
73 Eugene's widow, the administrator of Eugene's estate, Glenn, and Glenn's wife collec-
tively recovered $103,500 from the tortfeasor's liability insurance policy. Eugene's wife and
estate recovered an additional $200,000 from UM coverage provided in Twin Electric's Com-
mercial Auto Policy. Glenn and his wife recovered $100,000 from the same commercial policy,
as well as $100,000 from UM coverage under a separate personal auto insurance policy. Id. at
1161-62.
74 See id. at 1163-64 (although the policy was not an automobile policy per se, liability
coverage for non-owned vehicles, in the court's opinion, brought the policy within the purview
of Ohio's UM law).
75 Linko v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 739 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ohio 2000).
76 This occurred either because the insurers were unaware of the type of offer or rejection
required by the statute or, more likely, because they did not consider the policy to be a motor
vehicle policy requiring a ULM offer.
77 Insurers were careful to make the proper, written offer and to attain the proper, signed
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In a 4-3 decision, the court created UM by operation of law at the
liability limits of $2 million and extended it to the Selander brothers.78
In its reasoning, the court found that coverage of "hired" or "non-
owned" automobiles in the general liability policy provided sufficient
coverage of automobiles to make the policy a motor vehicle policy.79
From this opinion came the oft-quoted sentence: "Where motor vehi-
cle liability coverage is provided, even in limited form, [UM] must be
provided. 8° Suddenly UM went from providing minimal compensa-
tion to providing excess coverage in the millions on commercial poli-
cies, some even expressly excluding UM coverage. 81 As Chief Jus-
tice Moyer prophetically mused in his dissent: "The majority has
opened a Pandora's box. This opinion will overwhelmingly reach
every existing company policy. ' 82  With this new law in hand, the
plaintiffs' attorneys of Ohio rushed to share in the bounty of this Pan-
dora's box.
B. Scott-Pontzer: An Off-Duty Employee Can Be an Insured Under
Commercial Insurance Policies
Exactly three weeks after the Selander decision, the court ex-
panded UM even further in the highly criticized Scott-Pontzer deci-
rejection after Selander with the issuance of any commercial policy that provided any motor
vehicle coverage. However, the insurers could do nothing to remedy non-conforming policies
issued prior to the holding.
78 Selander, 709 N.E.2d at 1165. The Selander court was not the first court to find that a
commercial general liability policy could be considered a motor vehicle policy and have UM
coverage imposed as a matter of law for failure to offer. The same was done by the Arizona
Supreme Court, which was relied upon in Selander. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Gilmore, 812 P.2d 977 (Ariz. 1991). Note that Selander was decided prior to Senate Bill 20
which disallowed "stacking" of coverages. S.B. 20, 120th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
1993); see generally Matthew Devery McCormack, Comment, Tracking Ohio Insurance Cover-
age: The Genesis and Demise of Savoie, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 293 (1994) (discussing the
Ohio General Assembly's overruling of an Ohio Supreme Court decision allowing stacking of
coverages). Where stacking is permitted, the limits of each relevant insurance policy are added
together to determine total allowable recovery. In other words, the relevant policies are
"stacked" to determine total allowable recovery.
Where stacking is not permitted, one can only recover on a UM policy if the total re-
covered on other policies is below the UM limits. If it is lower, then the total allowable recov-
ery on the UM policy is the difference between the UM limits and the total recovered. Thus, in
Selander, if stacking were permitted and the total damages were determined to be $2.5 million,
the plaintiffs would recover the entire $2.0 million (the UM limits). After Senate Bill 20, the
Selander plaintiffs could only recover $1.5 million, the difference between the UM limits ($2
million) and total recovered ($500,000). See generally 3 WiDiss, supra note 19, § 35.4 (discuss-
ing various judicial approaches to plaintiffs' attempts to "stack" UM).
79 Selander, 709 N.E.2d at 1163-64.
80 Id. at 1163.
81 ld. at 1165 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 1166 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
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83
sion. Again, the insured did not make the proper offer and rejection
of UM, and the court implied UM as a matter of law at the policy's
liability limits. This time, however, the court extended UM to an off-
duty employee of the corporate policyholder. The court found that
naming only a corporation as the named insured was ambiguous.
Construing ambiguous terms against the insurer,84 as the court
claimed was "universally h[e]ld," the court found the plaintiffs de-
ceased husband to be an insured under the commercial policy. 85 The
court reasoned:
[I]t would be reasonable to conclude that "you," while refer-
ring to Superior Dairy, also includes Superior's employees,
since a corporation can act only by and through real live per-
sons. It would be nonsensical to limit protection solely to the
corporate entity, since a corporation, itself, cannot occupy an
automobile, suffer bodily injury or death, or operate a motor
vehicle. Here, naming the corporation as the insured is mean-
ingless unless the coverage extends to some person or per-
sons-including to the corporation's employee.
83 Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 710 N.E.2d 1116 (Ohio 1999), overruled in
part by Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio 2003).
84 This is the well-established doctrine of contra proferentem. Under this doctrine, con-
tract language is construed against the party that drafted the contract since that party controlled
the language and created the ambiguity. 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 32:12 (4th ed. 1999) ("These principles are often
applied to insurance policies, which are drafted solely by the insurer."); 2 LEE R. Russ &
THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:14 (3d ed. 1997) (stating the same proposi-
tion). Contra Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1021, 1031 (Md. 1993)
(citing Cheney v. Bell National Life, 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md. 1989) ("Maryland does not
follow the rule, adopted in many jurisdictions, that an insurance policy is to be construed most
strongly against the insurer.").
85 Scott-Pontzer, 710 N.E.2d at 1119.
86 Id. at 1119. Of course, this assertion would be correct if the corporation actually chose
to purchase UM. UM provides very little, if any, protection to a corporation. Because, as the
Scott-Pontzer court pointed out, a corporation cannot suffer bodily injury or death, one must
construe the corporation to mean the employees in order for UM to have any usefulness or
meaning. However, Superior Dairy purchased the automobile and umbrella policies to protect
its assets in the form of liability protection and property protection. In this context, it is abso-
lutely sensical to limit protection to the corporation since a corporation can become liable for
damages to others and can own property such as a fleet of vehicles.
The primary mistake the court made was to import public policies applicable to indi-
viduals to corporations. An individual would want to purchase UM coverage, to protect one's
self, along with one's automobile liability policy purchased to protect one's assets. A corpora-
tion, on the other hand, would not make the same choice. A corporation, such as Superior
Dairy, would want to protect its assets. However, since a corporation cannot suffer bodily
injury or death, the corporation would not choose to purchase UM. The court was correct, a
corporation as the only named insured in a UM policy is nonsensical. This should have led the
court to refuse to imply UM as against the obvious intent of the parties, instead of including all
the employees of Superior Dairy as named insureds-a far less reasonable response.
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Even more perplexing, the court refused to enforce the express re-
striction within the excess/umbrella insurance policy that coverage
apply only to employees acting within the scope of employment. The
court held that "any language in the . . . umbrella policy restricting
insurance coverage was intended to apply solely to excess liability
coverage and not for purposes of underinsured motorist coverage.
87
Henceforth, whenever courts created UM by operation of law, courts
did so without the exclusions, restrictions, or limitations with which
insurers ordinarily would have issued it.88
Three months later, in September of 1999, the court, in Ezawa,89 in
a one-sentence opinion, extended the faulty Scott-Pontzer logic to
find that the son of an employee injured in a car accident completely
unrelated to the employer's business was insured under a commercial
insurance policy. "Pandora's box continue[d] to release its con-
tents." 90
If it truly is "well settled that an insurance policy is a contract and
that the relationship between the insured and the insurer is purely
contractual in nature,"9' then Scott-Pontzer was an erroneous deci-
sion. It is a fundamental tenet that contracts are to be interpreted so
as to give effect to the parties' intentions.92 Neither the insurer nor
the corporate policyholder intended to provide UM to the corpora-
tion's employees and their families when engaged in activities com-
pletely detached from the corporation's business.93 In fact, the plain
Applying insurance laws to commercial and individual insureds without distinction is a
problem that the Scott-Pontzer court shares with the legislature who overruled it with S.B. 97.
Both the legislature and courts of Ohio need to realize that commercial entities and individuals
purchase insurance for different reasons, possess disparate sophistication, and that each invoke
different public policies. Had the legislature realized this, perhaps they would have wisely left
individual policies alone and applied S.B. 97 only to commercial policies as suggested infra Part
V.B.1.
87 Id. at 1120.
88 Examples of these limitations not extended to UM created by operation of law include
deductible limitations, see Hall v. Kemper Ins. Cos., No. 02CA17, 2003 WL 22336027, at *18
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2003), and automobile exclusions, see Burkhart v. CNA Ins. Co., No.
2001CA00265, 2002 WL 316224 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2002) (refusing to enforce clause that
excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of the use of an automobile).
89 Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am., 715 N.E.2d 1142 (Ohio 1999), over-
ruled by Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio 2003).
90 Id. at 1143 (Stratton, J., dissenting).
91 Scott-Pontzer, 710 N.E.2d at 1119.
92 Skivolocky v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 313 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ohio 1974); see also King v. Na-
tionwide Ins. Co., 519 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ohio 1988).
93 Scott-Pontzer, 710 N.E.2d at 1122-23 (Stratton, J., dissenting); Westfield Ins. Co. v.
Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1266 (Ohio 2003) ("[I]t is doubtful that either an insurer or a corpo-
rate policyholder ever conceived of contracting for coverage for off-duty employees occupying
noncovered autos, let alone the family members of the employees.").
101120051
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
language of the contract clearly evinces their desire not to insure em-
ployees outside the scope of employment.94
Nonetheless, Scott-Pontzer and its progeny became the law, and
plaintiffs' attorneys across Ohio reexamined old cases and eagerly
inspected insurance policies issued to clients' employers or clients'
family members' employers. To the attorneys' delight, many of these
policies contained the Scott-Pontzer ambiguity-the corporation as
the only named insured.95 The attorneys were further aided by the
classification of UM claims as contractual claims 96 with a fifteen-year
statute of limitations 97 as opposed to the two-year limit for tort
claims.
98
The critical element that permitted the courts to impose UM, when
no premium was received for the coverage, was the insurer's failure
to make a proper UM offer. The case law followed in Scott-Pontzer,
Selander, and Ezawa required that the insurer's offer and the in-
sured's rejection both be in writing.99 Because insurers rarely made
proper UM offers,' °° courts often provided coverage by operation of
law.
C. Linko: The Meaningful Offer Requirement
In 2000, the court landed another huge blow against the insurance
industry in Ohio. It brought even more potential claims within the
Scott-Pontzer purview with the Linkol° l decision. Linko held that
section 3938.17 required a "meaningful" offer, one that is "an offer in
substance and not just in name."'' 02  To constitute a meaningful offer
94 See Scott-Pontzer, 710 N.E.2d at 1120. By extending coverage to off-duty employees
and their families, the court ignored what Professor Keeton termed an "implicit understanding"
that an ambiguity will not be construed in favor of coverage if such construction is against the
reasonable expectations of the insured. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 969 (1970). Clearly in Scott-Pontzer and its
progeny, the employees and their relatives did not expect to be insured by their employers'
insurance policies. Only after consulting attorneys did the insureds realize that they had claims
against these commercial insurers.
95 See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1262 (Ohio 2003) (describing how
the insurance industry uses standard forms promulgated by the Insurance Services Office, Inc.);
see also Jason A. Mosbaugh, Note, What Happened in Ohio? Ohio UM/UM Litigation after
Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 N. KY. L. REV. 437, 438 (2003) (explaining why
most of the automobile insurance policies in Ohio contained exactly the same language).
96 Landis v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 695 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ohio 1998).
97 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (West 2004).
98 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (West 2004).
99 Abate v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 258 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ohio 1970); Gyori v. Johnston
Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 824, 825 (Ohio 1996).
100 See supra note 76 and infra note 109 and accompanying text for possible explanations
of why the insurers failed to make the proper UM offers.
101 Linko v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 739 N.E.2d 338 (Ohio 2000).
102 Id. at 342.
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and to avoid courts creating UM by operation of law, the Linko court
required the insurer to submit three elements in writing to the insured:
(1) a brief description of the coverage; (2) the premium for that cov-
erage; and (3) an express statement of the UM coverage limits.'0 3 The
court required written offers and rejections to avoid needless litigation
over whether either was in fact made. 104 The court required the three
elements to assure that the insured made an informed decision of
whether or not to reject UM. Like Scott-Pontzer and Selander, the
court was again divided 4-3 in favor of requiring this meaningful
written offer.1
0 5
While there is a strong policy reason for requiring a meaningful of-
fer and written rejection of UM, a state should implement it statuto-
rily. 10 6 Connecticut, for example, requires insurers to make a mean-
ingful offer of UM by statute. The statute provides detailed instruc-
tions to insurers explaining how to make the UM offer, even prescrib-
ing some of the exact language to be used on the offer form. Section
38a-336(a)(2) states that no reduction or rejection is
effective unless any named insured has signed an informed
consent form which shall contain: (A) An explanation of un-
insured and underinsured motorist insurance approved by the
commissioner; (B) a list of uninsured and underinsured mo-
torist coverage options available from the insurer; and (C) the
premium cost for each of the coverage options available from
the insurer. Such informed consent form shall contain a
heading in twelve-point type and shall state: "WHEN YOU
SIGN THIS FORM, YOU ARE CHOOSING A REDUCED
PREMIUM, BUT YOU ARE ALSO CHOOSING NOT TO
PURCHASE CERTAIN VALUABLE COVERAGE WHICH
PROTECTS YOU AND YOUR FAMILY. IF YOU ARE
UNCERTAIN ABOUT HOW THIS DECISION WILL
AFFECT YOU, YOU SHOULD GET ADVICE FROM
YOUR INSURANCE AGENT OR ANOTHER QUALIFIED
ADVISOR."
0 7
Stipulating the type of offer required by section 3937.18 in a retro-
active judicial decision was unfair to insurers. The language of the
103 Id.
4 Id. at 343.
1S Chief Justice Moyer, Justice Stratton, and Justice Cook dissented in Scott-Pontzer, Se-
lander, and Linko.
106 See Linko, 739 N.E.2d at 343-44 (Cook, J., dissenting) (accusing the court of imposing
"extrastatutory requirements upon insurers" with the three element requirement).
107 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38A-336(a)(2) (West 2000).
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statute only required that UM be "provided. '10 8 The insurers failed to
make Linko offers because they were unaware that such a descript
offer was required.' °9 It followed that practically every motor vehicle
policy issued prior to Linko brought before Ohio courts without UM
would have it imposed by operation of law. Worse yet for insurers,
when UM was imposed by operation of law it was implied without
any of the exclusions or restrictions with which it would normally
have been issued. 1t0
IV. S.B. 97: ELIMINATING THE UM OFFER REQUIREMENT
A. The Battle for Legislative Change
The year 2000 became a very bad year for insurers and their com-
mercial customers to whom the insurers passed on their losses via
premium increases."' The insurers marched to Ohio's capital with
their commercial customers in tow, who were for the most part small
businesses, to plead their case with the legislators. One by one they
testified before Ohio's General Assembly. They testified how these
two cases, Scott-Pontzer and Linko, had resulted in losses for the in-
surers and astronomical increases in premiums for their commercial
customers. 112 The insurance juggernaut Travelers lamented that it had
to pay out $50 million in claims while only collecting $47 million in
premiums. 113  The insurance industry and its legislative allies pro-
posed S.B. 97, which would make offers of UM completely optional
108 S.B. 267, 123d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000).
109See Robert H. Katz, Closing the Door on Scott-Pontzer, et al., 14 FORC Q.J. INS. LAW
& REG. 4 (Dec. 7, 2002), available at http://www.forc.org.
10 See Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 710 N.E..2d 1116, 1120 (Ohio 1999),
overruled in part by Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio 2003); see supra note
88 and accompanying text.
I IIt is important to note that the insurance industry's outcry related to Scott-Pontzer's ef-
fect on policies that had already been issued. Since the industry quickly responded to Scott-
Pontzer by clarifying the ambiguous language and making the appropriate offer of UM, Scott-
Pontzer had virtually no prospective effect on policies issued after the holding. See supra text
accompanying note 28 and infra text accompanying notes 130-132.
112 It is unclear whether the premium increases were levied to offset prior losses, to offset
future losses on policies issued prior to Scott-Pontzer and its progeny, to cover the additional
risk posed by an unpredictable and anti-insurance Ohio Supreme Court, or any combination of
these reasons.
113 Bill History, supra note 8. It is difficult to feel sympathy for Travelers' $3 million loss
when one considers that Travelers' enjoyed a $1.1 billion net profit in 2001, a year when most
corporations experienced losses. TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY CORP., 2002 ANNUAL
REPORT (2003), available at
http://investor.stpaultravelers.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=177842&p=irol-reports. Travelers' griev-
ances over relatively small losses resulting in a net profit have the same hollow ring as the
insurance industry's complaints over the losses in Massachusetts due to its compulsory insur-
ance laws. See supra note 50.
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and reduce the fifteen-year statute of limitations on UM claims to two
years. In effect, eliminating the offer requirement eliminates the op-
portunity for courts to imply UM and, in the unlikely event that courts
imply UM, the effects of such a decision would be much less costly
with the two-year statute of limitations.
Mr. Frank Todaro, representing the Ohio Academy of Trial Law-
yers, and Ms. Graci Jungkurth, a victim advocate for Mothers Against
Drunk Driving, argued for a statutory change less drastic than the
complete elimination of the offer requirement. 14 Mr. Todaro made
arguments similar to those in this Note: (1) that Linko and Scott-
Pontzer could be sufficiently dealt with by eliminating the need for an
offer only to commercial entities while retaining the offer requirement
for individual policies; (2) that insurers could cease to offer UM un-
der S.B. 97; and (3) that S.B. 97 would be a drastic divergence from
the rest of the United States. 115 Ms. Jungkurth's story is similar to the
draconian hypothetical posed at the beginning of this piece. An unin-
sured drunk driver hit Ms. Jungkurth, her two sons, and her husband.
Her husband and one of her sons died as a result. She testified that
without the mandatory offer and explanation, she may not have pur-
chased UM and would have lost everything."16
B. The New UM Statute
In the end, the commercial customers and insurers won the argu-
ment. The Ohio House and Senate overwhelmingly approved S.B.
97, and Governor Taft signed it into law on October 31, 2001.1"1 Its
proponents got their optional offer of UM, but had to settle for a
three-year statute of limitations, rather than the proposed two-year
limit.1 8 In its new form, section 3937.18 states, in relevant part:
3937.18 Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.
(A) Any policy of insurance delivered or issued for delivery
in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or
principally garaged in this state that insures against loss re-
sulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or
death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, may, but is not re-
quired to, include uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured
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motorist coverage or both uninsured and underinsured motor-
ist coverages.' 9
S.B. 97 states the intent of the General Assembly in enacting the new
act to:
(A) Protect and preserve stable markets and reasonable rates
for automobile insurance for Ohio consumers;
(B) Express the public policy of the state to:
(1) Eliminate any requirement of the mandatory offer
of uninsured motorist coverage...
(2) Eliminate the possibility of uninsured motorist
coverage ... being implied as a matter of law in any
insurance policy...
(E) To supersede the holdings of the Ohio Supreme Court in
Linko v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America (2000), 90 Ohio
St.3d 445, Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999),
85 Ohio St.3d 660, Schumacher v. Kreiner (2000), 88 Ohio
St.3d 358, Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1982),
69 Ohio St.2d 431, Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling
Group, Inc. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 565, and their progeny.120
C. The Problem with the New Statute
The major impact of section 3937.18 is the complete elimination
of the UM offer requirement. Insurers may now make the offer in
any manner they choose, make no offer at all, or refuse to provide
UM altogether. Since most individuals are not savvy or sophisticated
risk managers, they may not understand the need and value of pur-
chasing UM. Without a meaningful offer and an appreciation for
UM, fewer individuals will purchase the coverage. 12  Dispensing
119 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).
120 S.B. 97, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
121 See Rice, supra note 60, at 518. After requiring a UM offer, the number of consumers
in California purchasing UM with their automobile insurance policies rose from 25% to 90%.
Id. Thus, the impact of requiring a meaningful offer of UM to assure its purchase cannot be
overstated.
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with the written rejection requirement will further reduce the number
of drivers carrying UM. 122  Worse yet, the insurers may refuse to
provide UM even when requested by the purchaser. 
23
It is important to require that insurers make a meaningful offer of
UM to consumers to assure its continued purchase. A large inequality
in bargaining power exists between insurers and consumers. 124 Insur-
ers need to apprise consumers in conspicuous and clear language of
the availability of UM. Courts and legislatures recognize that insur-
ance policies are usually contracts of adhesion 125 and that consumers
generally accept the policies "as is.' ' 126  Furthermore, the consumer
may underestimate the need for UM. The consumer may mistakenly
believe that there are very few or no uninsured motorists because of
the compulsory liability laws, or that his liability policy protects him
from uninsured motorists. Underestimating the number of uninsured
motorists becomes even more dangerous when one considers that
uninsured motorists cause a disproportionately large number of car
accidents.
27
Another more subtle effect that S.B. 97 will have is changing the
public policy of Ohio. The General Assembly boldly stated that its
intent was to express the public policy of Ohio as eliminating the UM
offer requirement. 28 In the future, when judges are confronted with
cases involving UM, they will tend to devalue the importance of UM.
This may result in grave and unintended consequences, such as an
122 See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 423 (stating that the high percentage of drivers carrying
UM is "due, in part, to the burdens that state law imposes on both the insurer and the insured if a
rejection of [UM] is being considered"). By removing the "burden" posed by the UM offer and
rejection requirements, S.B. 97 is sure to decrease the number of insureds who purchase UM.
123 Recall that insurers dislike UM because of unfavorable judicial treatment and because it
forces them to oppose their customers: the insureds. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Insurers created UM only as a way of avoiding compulsory liability insurance. See supra note
57. A practitioner faced with an insurer who has refused to provide UM coverage may consider
using a "regulatory estoppel" argument in order to have UM implied as a matter of law. Repre-
sentatives of the insurance industry represented to the General Assembly that if S.B. 97 was
passed, insurers would continue to offer UM. First Hearing on S.B. 97 Before House Comm. on
Ins., 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001). Because the General Assembly relied on
these representations in passing S.B. 97, insurers should be estopped from refusing to offer the
coverage. Cf. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 855 (N.J.
1993) (considering "estoppel-type arguments" for representations made by the insurance indus-
try throughout the regulatory history of the pollution-exclusion clause in commercial general
liability insurance policies).
124 Keeton, supra note 94, at 963.
125 Id. at 966.
126 See Ady v. West Am. Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ohio 1982) (noting that "[m]ost
consumers accept the policies in toto and do not question, let alone actively negotiate to change
or omit, any of the provisions in the pre-printed forms").
127 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 422.
128 S.B. 97, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
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innocent victim receiving no compensation. 29 UM exclusions previ-
ously treated with judicial hostility will enjoy a much warmer recep-
tion in Ohio courts.
It is for these reasons that forty-eight states require that insurers at
least make an offer of UM with every automobile insurance policy
sold.
V. How OHIO'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD HAVE ADDRESSED
SCOTT-PONTZER
A. Legislative Change Was Unnecessary
The Ohio Legislature did not need to change section 3937.18. The
statute, after all, was not the problem. The logic of Scott-Pontzer was
not the result of a poorly-worded statute in need of redrafting. In-
stead, it was the combined effect of a misguided court and a poorly-
worded insurance form, a court and form that have since changed.
Furthermore, it was evident at the time of S.B. 97 that Scott-Pontzer
had a limited life span and would die out without any legislative in-
tervention.
After the Scott-Pontzer ruling and prior to S.B. 97, insurers quickly
modified the language in their policies to protect themselves from the
costly holding.' 3° They removed the Scott-Pontzer ambiguity from
their policy forms and made the proper Linko offer of UM to fore-
close the possibility of UM implied as a matter of law.' 3' That being
the case, Scott-Pontzer did not apply to policies issued after its hold-
ing and had "little precedential value.' 3 2
Since S.B. 97 applied prospectively and not retroactively, it is un-
clear why it was necessary. Since all the insurance forms were
changed after Scott-Pontzer and prior to S.B. 97, the Ohio General
Assembly did not need to overrule Scott-Pontzer prospectively. In
129 See State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 583 N.E.2d 309 (1992). In Alexander, the
insured was injured while occupying his own insured vehicle as a passenger. The insured, Percy
Alexander, had liability and UM automobile insurance. However, due to exclusions in both
coverages, Percy fell into a paradoxical no man's land. Because the driver of Percy's car caused
the accident, Percy's liability insurance would have covered anyone in the world who was
injured as a result except, ironically, Percy due to a clause that excludes coverage for bodily
injuries to an insured. Percy's UM coverage excluded injuries caused by the driver of a vehicle
insured under the same policy, the so-called "household exclusion." The court found that the
UM exclusion was inconsistent with the former section 3937.18 and consequently found the
exclusion unenforceable. With S.B. 97, it is clear that applying the "household exclusion" is
consistent with the new statute and the new public policy. Thus, Percy Alexander would be
unable to recover under his liability and UM policies under today's regime.
130 Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1271 n.10 (Ohio 2003).
131 Id. at 1277 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
132 Id.
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other words, the damage was already done. What the insurers really
needed was a retroactive judicial overruling to rescue them from the
commercial policies issued before Scott-Pontzer.133  Undaunted by
this reality, the insurers seized the opportunity to campaign for legis-
lative change. While S.B. 97 did not save them from Scott-Pontzer, it
provided the industry with a great benefit by greatly reducing the pos-
sibility of a court creating UM by operation of law in an insurance
policy. S.B. 97 compensated the insurance industry for a past judicial
wrong with Ohio's drivers picking up the tab.
Courts in Ohio, limiting the Scott-Pontzer effect with a patchwork
of exceptions and limitations, made legislative change even more
unnecessary. The most popular and effective limitation was barring
the claim for violation of the notice or subrogation provisions of the
policy. Most automobile insurance policies require that an insured
give notice to the insurer that an action giving rise to a claim has oc-
curred. 134 In a UM setting, this is especially important for the insurer
to protect its interests by verifying that all possible tortfeasors are in
fact judgment proof.135  In Ohio, the courts relieve an insurer of its
obligation to provide coverage "if it is prejudiced by the insured's
unreasonable delay in giving notice. 1 36
Courts in Ohio have used this provision to deny Scott-Pontzer
claims. Those courts held that failure of an insured to give notice to
an insurer of a claim occurring prior to Scott-Pontzer is unreasonable,
notwithstanding that the insured had no way of knowing that such a
133 See Press Release, Hannah News Service, Ohio's Auto Insurance Lower Than Most
States (Aug. 14, 2001) (on file with author) (stating that insurers estimate that $1.5 billion
would be paid out on Scott-Pontzer related claims even after S.B. 97 was passed); T.C. Brown,
Court Upends Its Own Ruling on Insurance, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH), Nov. 6,
2003, at 1 (even after S.B. 97, insurers had reserved $2 billion for Scott-Pontzer claims).
134 See 3 WiDISS, supra note 19, § 42.2.
135 Notice is required to protect an insurer's subrogation rights. Early notice assures the in-
surer effective subrogation by giving it the ability to fully investigate the claim and to fully
pursue all possible tortfeasors and relevant insurance policies. See Ferrando v. Auto-Owner's
Mut. Ins. Co., 781 N.E.2d 927 (Ohio 2002); see also 3 WIDiss, supra note 19, § 44.4. The
notice and subrogation provisions also help protect the insurer from possible collusion between
the insured and tortfeasor. See Bogan v. Progressive Ins. Co., 521 N.E.2d 447, 456 (Ohio
1988), overruled on other grounds by Ferrando v. Auto-Owner's Mut. Ins. 781 N.E.2d 927
(Ohio 2002).
Without subrogation and notice requirements, there would be little incentive for an in-
sured to seek a large recovery from a tortfeasor whose liability limits are below the insured's
UM limits. Because stacking is not permitted, the insured's total possible recovery will be his
UM limits regardless of how much is collected from the tortfeasor. The difference between the
UM limits and the amount recovered from the tortfeasor will be paid by the UM insurer. It is of
little consequence to the insured how the distribution is allocated, but it is of a great conse-
quence to the insurer. See supra note 78 for discussion on stacking. Furthermore, an insured
may, for convenience, prefer to recover from the insurer rather than the tortfeasor. Schwartz,
supra note 6, at 430.
136 Ferrando, 781 N.E.2d at 945.
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claim existed and further being unaware of any notice provision
within the policy. 37 They ruled that awaiting a favorable Supreme
Court decision is not a reasonable excuse for the delay. This limita-
tion could effectively defeat all Scott-Pontzer claims except for the
rare occasion when the claimant could show that the insurer suffered
no prejudice from the delay.' 38
Insurers will no longer need to rely on this patchwork of excep-
tions and limitations to Scott-Pontzer. On November 5, 2003, the con-
servative majority of the Ohio Supreme Court came to the rescue of
the insurance industry. In yet another 4-3 decision, Galatis overruled
the highly criticized Scott-Pontzer decision.1 39 Galatis held that nam-
ing a corporation as the insured could extend insurance coverage to
employees but "only if the loss occurs within the course and scope of
employment."'' 40 Because of the changing composition of the Ohio
Supreme Court from a liberal to conservative majority, the Ohio Gen-
eral Assembly might have foreseen this action by the court. Such
foresight would have made a legislative change even less necessary.
B. Overrule With More Finely Tailored Drafting
The Ohio General Assembly could have modified Section 3937.18
to negate the effects of Scott-Pontzer and its progeny while prevent-
ing similar future actions by the judiciary and assuring the availability
and presence of UM in personal automobile insurance policies. Leg-
islative responses should have focused on the insurance industry's
major complaint: the judicial creation of UM at the extremely high
liability limits when the insured paid no premium.
1. The Commercial Exception
To best achieve the above-stated objectives, the Ohio General As-
sembly should have eliminated the requirement of a UM offer for
commercial general liability, excess liability, and umbrella policies,
while retaining the offer requirement for personal automobile insur-
137 See, e.g., Nottingham v. Travelers Ins., No. 1605, 2003 WL 22462150, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 31, 2003); Erdmann v. Kobacher Co., No. L-02-1184, 2003 WL 22417240, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2003); Hammock v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. C-020783, 2003 WL
22213645, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2003); Kearney v. Valsi Cleaners, No. 02CAO11 I-M,
2003 WL 21508817, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 2, 2003); Woodrich v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 02CA3,
2002 WL 31151603, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2002); Gidley v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No.
20813, 2002 WL 570258, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2002). In fact, this was the issue upon
which the trial court denied coverage in the case that ultimately overruled Scott-Pontzer: West-
field Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1260 (Ohio 2003).
138 See Ferrando, 781 N.E.2d at 929.
139 Galatis, 797 N.E.2d at 1259.
140 1d.
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ance policies. Several other states facing a similar problem as Ohio,
including Arizona, took this approach.' 41 Recall that Selander relied
on the Arizona Supreme Court's Gilmore decision for implying UM
into a commercial general liability policy. 42 Arizona statutorily over-
ruled Gilmore in 1993 with the following addition to its UM statute:
An insurer is not required to offer, provide or make available
coverage conforming to this section in connection with any
general commercial liability policy, excess policy, umbrella
policy or other policy that does not provide primary motor
vehicle insurance for liabilities arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, operation or use of a specifically insured motor
vehicle. 143
Arizona limited its statutory overruling to commercial policies and
left individual policies alone.
This approach would foreclose the possibility of the judiciary im-
posing UM in a commercial insurance policy where the parties did
not intend UM. The Arizona statute does not limit a corporation's
option to purchase the coverage if so desired. Yet the offer require-
ment persists for policies that provide primary motor vehicle insur-
ance for vehicles specifically identified, 144 which are likely the only
cars that corporations would desire to cover with UM. Corporations
might choose to provide UM coverage to drivers and passengers of
141 It is interesting to note that Arizona contemplated completely eliminating the UM offer
requirement as Ohio has with S.B. 97. See Joel DeCiancio, Comment, Legislative Review S.B.
1445-The Legislature's Attempt to Reverse Judicial Treatment of Uninsured and Underinsured
Motorist Coverage in Arizona, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 469, 480-84 (1998). Due to strong opposition,
those interested agreed to place the bill on the November 1998 ballot to allow the voters to
decide. Id. For reasons unknown to this author, the bill never appeared on the November 1998
ballot, and the Arizona UM statute continues to require insurers to offer UM. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-259.01 (West Supp. 2004).
142 Selander v. Erie Ins. Group, 709 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Ohio 1999) (citing St. Paul Fire &
Marine hIs. Co. v. Gilmore, 812 P.2d 977, 985 (Ariz. 1991)); see supra note 78.
143 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01(L) (West Supp. 2004); see Ormsbee v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 865 P.2d 807 (Ariz. 1993). Several states have similar statutory commercial exceptions.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284(a) (2000) ("No insurer shall be required to offer, provide
or make available coverage conforming to this section in connection with any excess policy,
umbrella policy or any other policy which does not provide primary motor vehicle insurance for
liabilities arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of a specifically insured
motor vehicle."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1201(A)(3) (2000) ("No uninsured or underinsured
motorist coverage need be provided in this state by an excess or umbrella policy of insurance.");
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.22.030(2) (West Supp. 2005) ("The coverage required to be
offered under this chapter is not applicable to general liability policies, commonly known as
umbrella policies, or other policies which apply only as excess to the insurance directly applica-
ble to the vehicle insured."); see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-6413(2) (Michie 1998). But
see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:15(I) (2004) (explicitly requiring offer of UM coverage for
umbrella and excess policies).
144 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01(L) (West Supp. 2004).
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company cars to protect those furthering its business, and also to
avoid possible lawsuits against it brought by those injured without
any other means of recovery.
Eliminating the required offer of UM to commercial purchasers of
insurance is a more tailored response to the negative effects of Scott-
Pontzer. First, the Scott-Pontzer anomaly only occurs with respect to
commercial insurance policies. A fortiori, any legislative response
should have focused on commercial policies. Second, a corporation
is less in need of a meaningful UM offer than an individual.
The two fears regarding S.B. 97 with respect to individuals are: (1)
that one may not purchase UM either because he does not appreciate
the need and importance for having it or does not know it is available
due to a lack of offer; and (2) that one may be unable to purchase UM
because insurers refuse to provide it. These fears are not as great for
corporate entities. Unlike individuals, corporations have educated
and sophisticated business managers who are aware of the available
insurance coverages. Therefore, there is little need for an insurer to
explain to them the availability and importance of UM since they
should already appreciate it. One of the Scott-Pontzer dissenters,
Justice Cook, embraced this sentiment in his Gyori dissent: "[I]n rela-
tion to the average household consumer [a meaningful offer] more
often than not will require an insurance carrier to tender a formal of-
fer explaining the statutory offering requirements and other available
options, the same does not hold true for the sophisticated insurance
,,145purchaser ....
If insurers do not make UM available, the effects upon a corpora-
tion are less severe than the effects upon an individual. Workers'
Compensation and personal automobile policies would still protect
employees of the corporation when in the course and scope of em-
ployment. 146 Furthermore, corporations are unlikely to fret over the
inability to protect employees and their families while outside the
course and scope of employment. UM, therefore, provides a minimal
benefit to a corporation.
47
145 Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 824 (Ohio 1996) (Cook,
J., dissenting).
16 This point illustrates how vulnerable Ohio drivers are under this new law. These em-
ployees are less likely to carry UM on their personal policies today without a meaningful offer
requirement under S.B. 97. They are, therefore, more likely to go without compensation.
Instead of eliminating one path of recovery for a victim of an uninsured motorist (the commer-
cial policy), S.B. 97's categorical approach may cut off a second path of recovery as well (the
individual's personal policy).
147 See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1264 (Ohio 2003) (observing that
insuring off-duty employees "is extraneous to the general intent of a commercial auto policy"
and "absen[t] of any benefit to the ... corporation").
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The impact of implied UM is far more costly to insurers for corpo-
rate insurance policies than for personal automobile policies. This is
because when courts created UM by operation of law in Ohio, courts
did so at the liability limits. 148 For individuals, this means implied
UM would in most cases not exceed $100,000. However, for a corpo-
ration the limits could easily reach several million dollars. 149 This,
together with the fact that Scott-Pontzer only affected commercial
policies, explains why commercial insurance policies experienced
premium increases exponentially higher than personal automobile
policies following Scott-Pontzer.150
Frank Todaro and Rep. Metelsky similarly argued in front of the
House Insurance Committee to eliminate the offer requirement for
commercial policies, but to maintain it for personal automobile poli-
cies. 15  The proponents of S.B. 97 who were opposed to exempting
personal automobile policies responded that to do so "would dramati-
cally weaken the bill to the point of missing its stated purpose, which
is to prevent any future Ohio Supreme Court decisions from expand-
ing the scope of such coverage beyond what the legislature in-
tended. ,
52
Maintaining the UM offer requirement for individual policies
would not weaken the bill since the court was expanding the scope of
UM beyond legislative intent only with respect to commercial poli-
cies, leaving personal automobile policies mostly unaffected. The
four cases that were actually overruled by S.B. 97 involved only
commercial policies. 53  While the Ohio General Assembly claims
that S.B. 97 overruled Sexton, this author respectfully disagrees. Sex-
ton, listed as one of the five cases overruled by S.B. 97, was the only
listed case that involved a personal automobile insurance policy. The
passing of S.B. 97 completely unaffected Sexton since S.B. 267 pre-
148 Selander v. Erie Ins. Group, 709 N.E.2d 1161, 1165 (Ohio 1999).
149 Many corporations simultaneously carry automobile, general liability, and umbrella
policies. Each policy could have liability limits in the millions, cumulatively providing suffi-
cient UM limits to fully compensate almost any injury. See, e.g., Lawler v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 322 F.3d 900, 902 (6th Cir. 2003) (employer had $2 million business automobile policy
and $10 million umbrella liability policy); Dolly v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 200 F. Supp. 2d 823,
826 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (employer had $3 million liability policy and $5 million umbrella liability
policy); Selander v. Erie Ins. Group, 709 N.E.2d 1161, 1162 (Ohio 1999) (employer had $1
million per occurrence and $2 million aggregate CGL policy).
150 The Council of Smaller Enterprises (COSE) presented examples to the General Assem-
bly of small businesses who experienced huge insurance rate increases, some as high as 900%.
See Third Hearing on S.B. 97 Before House Comm. on Ins., 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2001).
151 Fifth Hearing on S.B 97 Before House Comm. on Ins., 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2001).
152 Id.
153 See supra text accompanying note 120.
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viously overruled that case.' 54  Furthermore, the court had halted its
expansion of UM by refusing to imply UM into a homeowner's insur-
ance policy that provided coverage for a limited class of motor vehi-
cles not subject to registration in Davidson v. Motorists Mutual Insur-
ance Co.155 Davidson was important not only because it showed there
were limits to the court's UM implication, but it more clearly defined
for insurers which insurance policies actually require UM offers. 
1 6
2. Declare Ohio a "Minimum Liability" State
One of the major complaints of the insurance industry was that
UM, created by operation of law, was implied at limits equal to the
liability limits. 57 This effect was especially harsh with the million
dollar liability limits of commercial insurance policies. 158  The lan-
guage of section 3937.18 compelled the use of the liability limits for
the determination of implied UM limits. Prior to S.B. 97, section
3937.18 read: "Uninsured motorist coverage... shall be in an amount
of coverage equivalent to the automobile liability or motor vehicle
1)159liability coverage ....
There are two UM philosophies in the United States: "full recov-
ery" and "minimum liability.' 60 The overall policy of UM is the
154 S.B. 267, 123d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000). Sexton involved a father who
sought UM coverage under his automobile policy to pay for funeral expenses for his daughter
who was killed as a passenger in an uninsured motorist's car. The court awarded coverage
finding that the statute did not require that the insured suffer a bodily injury, only that he be
legally entitled to recover damages because of a bodily injury. Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ohio 1982). S.B. 267 modified section 3937.18 to require that
the insured actually suffer the bodily injury in order to recover.
55 744 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio 2001).
156 To be a motor vehicle policy, the policy must provide liability protection for vehicles
subject to registration. Davidson, 744 N.E.2d at 718. Further guidance as to what policies
require UM offers was provided with House Bill 261. This bill added subsection (L) to section
3937.18 to define a "motor vehicle liability policy" requiring a UM offer as "[a]ny policy of
insurance that serves as proof of financial responsibility... for owners or operators of the motor
vehicles specifically identified in the policy of insurance." H.B. 261, 122d Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 1997). This bill limited Selander's holding to policies issued prior to H.R. 261's
enactment. For policies issued after its enactment, offers of UM were only required for policies
that specifically identified automobiles. Gilcreast-Hill v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., No. 20983,
2002 WL 2008974, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2002). It could be argued that this bill alone
provided adequate guidance to insurers as to what policies require a UM offer and made S.B. 97
unnecessary.
157 S.B. 267, 123d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000).
158 Recall in Selander that UM created by operation of law was done so at the $2 million
liability limits from the commercial general liability policy. See supra text accompanying note
78.
159 S.B. 267, 123d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000).
16oSee Lisa K. Gregory, Annotation, "Excess" or "Umbrella" Insurance Policy as Pro-
viding Coverage for Accidents with Uninsured or Underinsured Motorists, 2 A.L.R.5th 922
(1992) (discussing the two approaches to UIM and how the philosophy evinced by the state's
UM statute is determinative of whether courts imply UM into excess or umbrella commercial
SLAMMING THE LID ON PANDORA'S BOX
same across the United States: to put the injured party in substantially
the same position that he would have been, had the driver been in-
sured. 16  The question to be resolved, then, is how well should this
tortious driver have been insured. How a state answers this question
determines whether it is a "full recovery" or "minimum liability"
state.
States that impute this uninsured tortious driver with the full liabil-
ity limits of the injured party's insurance policy are "full recovery"
states.162 It is the policy of these states that UM should provide an
individual with the same protection that he provides to strangers.
These states, including pre-S.B. 97 Ohio, demand UM offers at the
liability limits. When insurers do not give the proper offer, courts
create UM by operation of law at the full liability limits. 163
States that impute the uninsured driver with the legal minimums of
liability insurance are "minimum liability" states. 64 In these states,
the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute is not to make
all drivers whole from accidents with uninsured drivers, but
to make sure that drivers injured by such drivers are protected
to the extent that they would have been protected had the
driver at fault carried the statutory minimum of liability in-
surance.1
65
"Minimum liability" states require that insurers provide UM at statu-
torily determined minimum levels, usually equal to the minimum
liability limits set forth in the state's financial responsibility law. 66
Failure to provide UM results in its creation by operation of law at the
statutory minimums. 167
The Ohio General Assembly could have adequately responded to
the insurance industry's complaints by declaring Ohio a "minimum
liability" state. The Ohio Legislature could have easily accomplished
this solution by requiring that insurers offer UM at the minimum li-
insurance policies).
161 See, e.g., Hoglund v. State Farm Ins. Co., 592 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Il1. 1992).
162 See Gregory, supra note 160, at 934.
163 See, e.g., Selander v. Erie Ins. Group, 709 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Ohio 1999).
164 See Gregory, supra note 160, at 934.
165 Pabitzky v. Frager, 210 Cal. Rptr. 426, 427 (Ct. App. 1985).
166See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-7-23 (1999) (requiring UM coverage with each automobile
insurance policy at limits equal to those set in its Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, ALA.
CODE § 32-7-6 (1999): $20,000 per person and $40,000 per accident); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/143A-2 (West Supp. 2004) (mandating requirements similar to Alabama's).
167 See, e.g., Am. Universal Ins. Co. v. Russell, 490 A.2d 60, 62 (R.I. 1985).
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ability limits as stated in Ohio's Financial Responsibility Act.
168
These changes would have virtually nullified the costly effects of
Scott-Pontzer and its progeny. First, in those situations where UM
was created by operation of law, it would be done at the Ohio statu-
tory minimums of $12,500 per person and $25,000 per accident. 169
This cost to the insurer for its failure to make an offer of UM is expo-
nentially smaller than the cost incurred with the $2 million UM limits
under the "full recovery" regime that Selander dictated.
Furthermore, because stacking is not permitted in Ohio, insurers
would only be required to provide this minimum coverage when the
insured recovered less than $12,500.170 In Selander, for example, the
plaintiff would not have recovered from the commercial policy under
a "minimum liability" regime. The plaintiffs had already recovered a
sum far exceeding the $12,500 limit that courts would have im-
plied.' 7' The likelihood that an insured employee will be unable to
recover more than $12,500 becomes even less likely when one con-
siders that Workers' Compensation benefits count toward the total as
well.
172
Second, "minimum liability" states find that policy to be irrecon-
cilable with implying UM into excess or umbrella policies. 173 Recall
that Scott-Pontzer found imposition of UM by operation of law in an
umbrella/excess policy to be consonant with the "full recovery" pol-
icy of the former section 3837.18.174 Saving insurers from the possi-
bility of UM creation by operation of law in excess and umbrella in-
surance polices would represent a further cost savings to insurers.
It is unclear to what philosophy Ohio now subscribes. In wiping
out the offer requirement from section 3937.18, the Ohio General
Assembly also wiped out the language indicating how much UM in-
surers should provide. What then is the policy of Ohio? How much
insurance should we impute to the uninsured tortious driver? If insur-
168 In fact, Ohio was a "minimum liability" state until 1982 when House Bill 489 was en-
acted. H.B. 489, 114th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1982). Prior to H.B. 489, section
3937.18 required insurers to provide UM coverage "in limits for bodily injury or death set forth
in section 4509.20," Ohio's Financial Responsibility Act. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18
(West 1971).
169 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.20 (West 1999).
170 See supra note 78 (explaining "stacking" of UM).
171 Recall that the Selander plaintiffs had already recovered more than $500,000 from other
policies. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
171 See OHlIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (E) (West Supp. 2004).
173 See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Howe, 488 So.2d 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (ap-
plying Rhode Island's "minimum liability" law in refusing to imply UM into umbrella policy
since an injured must have already recovered at least the minimum from the underlying primary
policy).
1See Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 710 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ohio 1999),
overruled in part by Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio 2003).
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ers choose to continue offering UM, at what limits will they offer it?
The discretionary language of the new section 3937.18 indicates that
the legislature has left these decisions to the insurers.
3. Mandate a Minimum Amount of UM Without the Opportunity to
Reject.
What was most costly to the insurers in Scott-Pontzer and its prog-
eny was the creation of UM by operation of law in policies where the
insurers did not collect premiums for UM. Insurers could not stay in
business very long if they were required to pay on policies where they
collected no premiums. Presumably, the industry would have no
complaints, however, if it had collected premiums on the relevant
policies. The Ohio Legislature could have limited the creation of UM
by the courts where the insurer collected no premium by mandating
UM in all policies that provide motor vehicle coverage and refusing
to permit the insured to reject the coverage. 175
This approach is similar to that used successfully by New York, a
state at the vanguard of automobile insurance law. New York re-
quires that automobile insurance policies automatically include UM at
the minimum mandatory liability limits. 176 However, New York per-
mits the insured to purchase a greater amount of UM up to the liabil-
ity limits in the policy. 177 Its statute requires that insurers offer this
additional coverage in writing. 17
8
This requirement, that insurers offer additional UM up to the li-
ability limits, would not remedy the problem in Ohio. Therefore, the
Ohio General Assembly should not include this in any Ohio plan.
Under the New York scheme, policies with minimum UM coverage
would still be susceptible to additional implied UM at the high liabil-
ity limits if the insurer failed to make the proper offer or receive the
proper rejection. To effectively respond to the fears of insurers in
Ohio, the legislature should give insurers complete discretion to offer
75 This is the approach favored by Professor Widiss. See WIDISS, supra note 5, § 8.3, at
286 ("[1]t seems both justifiable and desirable to eliminate the right to reject [UM] coverage in
order to assure protection for those classes of insureds who do not exercise a knowledgeable
waiver of the protection.").
176 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(0(1) (McKinney Supp. 2004). Maine employs a similar ap-
proach. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2902(2) (West Supp. 2004) ("the amount of [UM]
coverage to be so provided may not be less than the amount of coverage for liability for bodily
injury or death in the policy offered or sold to a purchaser unless the purchaser expressly rejects
such an amount, but in any event may not be less than the minimum limits for bodily injury
liability insurance provided for under [the Financial Responsibility Act]").
177 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(f)(2)(A) (McKinney Supp. 2004).
17 8 See N.Y. INs. LAW § 3420(f)(2)(B) ("[i]nsurers shall notify insureds, in writing, of the
availability of supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage").
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additional UM coverage, but no choice whether to offer the minimum
UM coverage.
The New York approach stands in stark contrast to Ohio's new ap-
proach. New York, in essence, allows the insured to choose whether
to adopt a "minimum liability" or "full recovery" policy. The insured
chooses whether he will impute the tortious driver with limits at the
minimum allowed by law or at limits equal to the insured's liability
limits. 179 Ohio, on the other hand, defers to the insurers to decide,
even on an ad hoc basis, what policy to adopt.
Automatically including UM in policies greatly reduces the possi-
bility that technical offer and rejection requirements may override the
intentions of the parties. Many of the cases in Ohio involved sophis-
ticated corporate entities that knowingly and voluntarily intended to
reject UM.180 Nonetheless, the courts would imply UM because the
insurer did not make the proper offer or because the insured did not
make the rejection in the proper manner. Mandating UM in these
policies dispenses with the offer and rejection requirements. This
avoids penalizing insurers for millions of dollars due to mere techni-
cal errors.
Mandating UM coverage also increases the likelihood that insurers
will collect premiums for UM on policies with the potential for court-
implied UM. When an insurer is unsure whether a policy provides
sufficient motor vehicle protection to mandate UM, they will surely
err on the side of providing it and collect a premium. If this approach
becomes too costly to consumers, the legislature can respond by draft-
ing more bright-line rules defining specifically which policies require
UM.
In the rare instances when the courts mandate UM in a policy
where the insurers had not collected a premium, the costs to the insur-
ers would be slight. The implied limits would be far below the limits
imposed under a Selander regime. Following the New York or Mas-
sachusetts approach, the limits would be, from the insurer's perspec-
tive, a paltry $12,500. As discussed in the preceding section, the
plaintiff would only recover this amount in the unlikely chance that
179 See supra notes 160-167 and accompanying text (discussing what insurance to impute
to an uninsured driver ).
180 See, e.g., Gyori v. Johnston Coca-Cola Bottling Group, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 824, 824 (Ohio
1996) (creating UM by operation of law at $15 million limits for lack of written offer, notwith-
standing that company's risk manager solicited bids with a specification expressly rejecting
UM); Campbell v. Westfield Ins. Co., No. 02AP-1369, 2003 WL 22332007, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 14, 2003) (creating UM by operation of law at $2 million limits for failure of written
offer/rejection form to meet Linko requirements, notwithstanding that company's owner know-
ingly chose to reject the coverage because his two-year experience with the coverage convinced
him it "was neither needed nor worth its cost").
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the total of other recoveries is below $12,500.81 In these instances,
the need for recovery by the insured is at its greatest. This approach
would significantly reduce the exposure of the insurers while placing
a fair share of the uninsured motorist burden upon them.
C. Additional Protection
The Ohio General Assembly could have accompanied the enact-
ment of S.B. 97 with other legislative action to maintain protection
for innocent motorists against uninsured motorists. Many legal para-
digm shifts involve a quid pro quo exchange. For example, under a
Workers' Compensation system, an employee traded his common law
right to sue an employer for a more certain no-fault statutory
scheme. 182 The employer traded his defenses of fellow servant, con-
tributory negligence, and assumption of risk for a more predictable
system without the costs of trial and the risk of high sympathetic jury
awards. 183 Each side lost some rights but gained other benefits. Thus,
the balance of equities was maintained.
With S.B. 97, however, the drivers of Ohio lost a guaranteed right
to purchase UM and received nothing in return. 184  The following
subsections discuss some additional protection that the Ohio General
Assembly could have provided to compensate Ohio drivers for the
protection lost with S.B. 97.
1. Increased Mandatory Liability Limits
Increasing the relatively low liability limits in Ohio would narrow
the gap of uncompensated damages widened by S.B. 97. Ohio's Fi-
nancial Responsibility Act requires that Ohio drivers carry liability
insurance with limits of $12,500 for bodily injury to or death of one
181 See supra text accompanying note 170-172.
182 See ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 100.01 (1997).
,83 ld.
184 The Ohio Legislature would argue that Ohio's drivers received lower automobile insur-
ance premiums in return for S.B. 97. Instead, the opposite is more likely true. Under Scott-
Pontzer, its progeny, and former section 3937.18, a portion of the draw on individual policies
had been displaced to commercial policies. Under S.B. 97, the likelihood that employees will
recover under commercial policies is far less likely and the claims on personal automobile
insurance policies will increase, causing a commensurate increase in premiums.
Additionally, UM premiums will increase because fewer insureds will purchase the
coverage without the statutorily required UM offer. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying
text. According to the law of large numbers, as the number of insured persons increases, the
accuracy of risk prediction increases. George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40
ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1021 (1989). The more accurately risk is predicted, the lower the premium
will be. See id. Inversely, if the number of UM insureds decreases, the risk becomes less pre-
dictable. Therefore, UM premiums in Ohio will increase due to the decrease in risk forecasting
caused by the reduction in the number of insureds in the risk pool.
2005] 1029
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
person in any one accident, $25,000 for bodily injury to or death of
more than one person in any one accident, and $7,500 for damage to
property in any one accident.' 85 The insurance industry numerically
represents these limits as 12.5/25/7.5. Punishments for failure to have
insurance at these statutory minimums include revocation of driving
privileges, impoundment of license plates, and fines.'
86
The Ohio limits are grossly inadequate. They are little higher than
they were when the law was first enacted in 1953 and have remained
unchanged for thirty-five years. 187 In fact, the reason that they have
remained unchanged for so long is likely because of the prevalence of
UM. Low minimum liability limits of tortfeasors are not an issue for
those injured persons carrying UM. Thus, few drivers would ever
look to these limits for recovery since their UM would often assure
them coverage beyond these low limits. With the abolition of the UM
offer requirement, more drivers may come to rely upon these low
limits.
There are only four states with limits lower than Ohio: Oklahoma
(10/20/10), Florida (10/20/10), Mississippi (10/20/5), and Louisiana
(10/20/10). 188 Oklahoma and Florida, however, have very consumer-
friendly informed consent forms required for UM offers and rejec-
tions that warn of the risks to insured and family of not purchasing
UM. 18 9 Since more drivers are likely to carry UM in those two states,
it is less likely that injured drivers will rely solely on the liability in-
surance of the tortfeasor. In other words, the only time one will rely
on these low liability minimum limits is when the injured driver has
acted against the advice of the government and knowingly chosen not
to purchase UM coverage. To borrow a concept from torts, it is as if
185 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.01 (West Supp. 2004).
186 Id.
87 In 1953, the law required 5/10/5. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.01(k) (West 1954)
(amended 1960). The 1960 revision raised these to 10/20/5. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4509.01(k) (West Supp. 1965) (amended 1970). The current 12.5/25/n.5 limits were set in 1970.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.01(k) (West Supp. 1972). If the minimum liability limits had
simply kept pace with inflation since 1970, the limits would be approximately 60/120/36. See
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Inflation Calculator, at http://bls.gov/cpi
(last visited May 7, 2005).
8 Insurance Information Institute, Auto, What Are the Driving Laws in my State?, at
http://www.iii.org/individuals/auto/a/stateautolaws (last visited May 6, 2005) [hereinafter III
Report] (listing each state's minimum liability limits).
189 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727 (West Supp. 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3636
(West Supp. 2005) (requiring form that states:
The law requires us to advise you of this valuable right for the protection of you,
members of your family, and other people who may be hurt while riding in your in-
sured vehicle. You should seriously consider buying this coverage in the same
amount as your liability insurance coverage limit. . . . THE COST OF THIS
COVERAGE IS SMALL COMPARED WITH THE BENEFITS!).
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the insured has assumed the risk of being injured by one with low
liability limits.
Whereas, in Ohio it might be said that drivers without UM have
not assumed the risk of braving the roads without UM's vital protec-
tion. Recall that one assumes a risk only if that person fully under-
stands and appreciates the risk yet voluntarily chooses to assume the
risk.1 90 Under S.B. 97, one does not assume the risk since the unpro-
tected driver does not fully understand the risk of driving without UM
unless he receives an adequate offer as stated in Linko. 19 1 Also, the
insured's decision would not be voluntary if insurers choose not to
offer UM coverage even when requested, as S.B. 97 permits insurers
to do.
While increasing the minimum limits would more fully compen-
sate motorists injured by drivers who purchase minimum coverage,
this increase must be offset by the number of minimum coverage pur-
chasers who would choose to forego purchasing any liability insur-
ance when faced with the associated higher premiums. Furthermore,
it must be considered that increasing the minimum limits does noth-
ing in the way of compensating those injured by hit-and-run drivers,
which is a growing epidemic. 19
2
2. Reduce Number of Uninsured Motorists
The Ohio legislature might have reduced the number of uninsured
motorists in Ohio by stricter enforcement of the Financial Responsi-
bility Act or increasing the severity of penalties for noncompliance
with the act. The number of uninsured motorists in Ohio is estimated
at 13%, which is just slightly below the U.S. average of 14%.' 9 3
Maine enjoys the lowest percentage of uninsured drivers at just 4%. 194
190 Restatement (Second) Torts § 496C (1965). The medical malpractice doctrine of "in-
formed consent" is equally applicable. Just as doctors are required to disclose and explain the
risks of different medical procedures to patients, Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145, 1148
(Ohio 1985), insurers should be required to disclose and explain to insureds the risks of driving
without UM.
19' Unko v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 739 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ohio 2000).
192 In response to this growing problem, Ohio has recently raised the penalties for hit-and-
run drivers. H.B. 50, 125th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2002). This author believes that
one factor that has led to the increase in hit-and-run accidents is the increased stiffness in DUI
criminal penalties, lower blood alcohol level limits, and greater social stigma associated with
DUI arrests. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (West Supp. 2004) (lowering legal limit
from 0.1 to 0.08). Drivers who have had a little to drink and are involved in small accidents
may not wait for the police out of fear of DUI penalties and social stigma.
193 News Release, Insurance Research Counsel, IRC Study Estimates 14% of Drivers Are
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While Ohio requires that operators of vehicles maintain liability
insurance, 95 it does not require that drivers verify coverage when
registering a vehicle. 196 At registration, Ohio only requires that the
applicant sign a statement affirming that the applicant maintains in-
surance and promising not to drive without proof of financial respon-
sibility.' 97 Ohio requires drivers to verify proof of insurance when
involved in a traffic accident requiring an accident report, upon re-
quest by a peace officer or highway patrol officer when receiving a
traffic ticket, or when randomly selected to provide proof by mail.1
98
It is unclear whether changing the Ohio law to require applicants to
verify proof of financial responsibility at the time of registration
would be effective. The Ohio General Assembly should couple this
law with a requirement that insurers notify the Department of Motor
Vehicles ("DMV") if and when the coverage is cancelled to avoid
uninsured motorists subverting the law. Otherwise, drivers might, for
example, purchase insurance simply to register the car, then cancel
the policy soon afterwards.
This approach has inefficiency drawbacks and high transaction
costs. For example, when one switches insurers, the DMV would
receive notice of a cancellation. To ensure that the formerly insured
has truly switched, an additional requirement would be necessary for
the new insurer to notify the DMV of a new policy. The DMV would
need to cross reference the cancellation and new policy. The DMV
would also need to account for lag times in reporting. This could
create great confusion with different policies for different cars under
the same named insured. Further problems occur when determining
who bears the transaction costs for reporting and accounting.'99 It is
far from clear, though, that compulsory insurance laws are effective
195 While liability insurance is the most common way to satisfy Ohio's Financial Respon-
sibility Law, drivers can use various other methods for compliance, including self-insurance,
bond, or deposit. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.45(A) (West Supp. 2004).
1
96 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.101(3) (West Supp. 2004).
197 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.20(B) (West 1999); see also OHIO BUREAU OF MOTOR
VEHICLES, Financial Responsibility Information, at
http://www.bmv.ohio.gov/FR-Requirements.html (last visited May 7, 2005).
198 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.101(3) (West Supp. 2004). It appears that there are two
types of "proof' of insurance required in Ohio. Under section 4509.44 and 4503.20, a signed
statement suffices as "proof" when registering a vehicle. However, under section 4509.101(3)
and 4509.45, a driver must "verify the existence of proof of financial responsibility" by furnish-
ing the actual insurance card issued by the insurer in the special situations when "verification" is
required.
199 See Karen Bouffard & Brad Heath, States Struggle to Police Uninsured, THE DETROrr
NEWS, Aug. 3, 2003. Work is underway, however, to develop a centralized web service data-
base for real-time reporting of liability insurance data incorporating all fifty states. Chris Grier,
Web Service Could Ease Auto Liability Reporting Burdens, BEST'S INSURANCE NEWS, Sept. 15,
2003.
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in reducing uninsured motorists.20 0 Compulsory insurance laws do
not account for out-of-state drivers, unregistered vehicles, or hit-and-
run drivers.
20 1
Increasing the severity of the penalties for violation of Ohio's Fi-
nancial Responsibility Act would very likely reduce the number of
uninsured motorists. Currently in Ohio, the punishment for driving
without insurance is suspension of the person's driving privileges and
impoundment of the person's license until the person can show proof
of insurance.0 2 The suspension occurs for a minimum of ninety
days.20 3 To reinstate his driving privileges, the formerly uninsured
driver must pay a fee of seventy-five dollars for the first violation,
two-hundred-fifty dollars for the second violation and five-hundred
dollars for violations thereafter. 2°
New York has a tougher approach than Ohio and, perhaps as a re-
sult, has half the number of uninsured motorists.20 5 Like Ohio, any-
one caught without insurance in New York will have his driver's li-
cense and registration revoked.20 6 In addition, uninsured drivers are
subject to fines of $900 to $2,250, or imprisonment for no more than
fifteen days, or both.207 The threat of imprisonment would serve as a
strong deterrent. It would also send a strong signal that Ohio consid-
ers driving without automobile insurance to be a serious crime.
3. No-Fault System & Compensation Fund
Ohio could have considered employing two alternate means for
compensating the victims of UMs: no fault and public compensation
funds.20 8 Twelve states currently use what is termed "no-fault" insur-
ance.209 In general, these systems require that drivers purchase insur-ance that covers that driver's own injuries regardless of who was at
200 Insurance Information Institute, Compulsory Auto Insurance Study, at
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/compulsory (last visited May 6, 2005) (noting that
New Hampshire does not have compulsory insurance laws, yet has fewer uninsured drivers than
nearby Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont who all have such laws).
201 Id.
202 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.101 (West Supp. 2004).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 7% of New York drivers are uninsured. IRC Study, supra note 193.
20 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 318 (McKinney Supp. 2003).
207 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 319 (McKinney Supp. 2003).
208 Maryland, for example, uses possibly the "most comprehensive and intricate system in
the United States," involving a combination of several methods including compulsory auto
insurance, required offer of UM, no-fault, and public fund. Joel P. Williams, Insurance Law-
Protecting the Public Under Maryland's Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Scheme, 25 U.
BALT. L. REV. 289, 295 (1996).
209 111 Report, supra note 188.
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fault for the injuries.210 Public compensation funds are a government
created and operated pool of money used to provide minimal com-
pensation to victims who have no other recourse for recovery.
While it is worth mentioning these other options, the benefits and
disadvantages of these alternate approaches to compensation are
widely discussed and beyond the scope of this Note.2 2
VI. BACK TO THE FUTURE: REINSTATING FORMER SECTION 3937.18
The opportunity still exists for the Ohio General Assembly to
compensate Ohio drivers for the protection that they lost with S.B. 97.
The legislature may still enact today all of the additional protections
and statutory changes discussed above that it should have considered
at the time of S.B. 97. However, since the Ohio Supreme Court has
regained its senses and overruled the illogical and costly aspects of
Scott-Pontzer, the reasons for enacting S.B. 97 have vanished. There-
fore, the easiest and most logical step that the legislature should take
is to reinstate the former section 3937.18 language and the meaning-
ful UM offer requirement.
VII. CONCLUSION
UM is a strange and confusing concept, and this is especially true
in Ohio.213 However, requiring that insurers make meaningful offers
of UM is still the best way to insure that drivers are adequately pro-
tected on the roads from uninsured motorists. An attorney's com-
ments thirty-eight years ago still ring true today:
[UM] is no panacea. It is still the subject of much contro-
versy, and perhaps even more bewilderment and confusion.
The path to a just award under this coverage is lined with pit-
falls, ruts, and hazardous curves in the form of conditions,
exclusions and restrictive definitions. Such is true, however,
of the path to recovery under most types of insurance. What-
ever the criticism, this experiment is registering a high degree
of success in achieving its objective - to alleviate many of the
210 Id
.
21 See supra note 53.
212See generally KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 45; JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ENDING
INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975).213 For an amusing example, see Mayor v. Wedding, No. 2003-P-001 1, 2003 WL 22931354
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2003) (involving the novel claim that a cow is an uninsured motorist).
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woes heretofore borne by the innocent victims of financially
irresponsible motorists. It seems to be here to stay.214
Scott-Pontzer and its correlative cases required corrective action.
However, it was not the Ohio General Assembly that needed to re-
spond. Those who needed to respond did so. The insurers changed
the language of their policies and the courts limited and eventually
overruled Scon-Pontzer. With the reasons for S.B. 97 no longer pre-
sent, the legislature should return to the old language of section
3937.18 requiring a meaningful offer of UM. If the legislature is not
amenable to reinstating the old language, they should consider other
methods for saving Ohio's drivers from being the least protected in
the United States.
MATHEW J. CAVANAGH t
214 Notman, supra note 33, at 23.
t J.D. Candidate, 2005, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to
thank my fiance, Amanda, for her patience and support during the writing of this note and
during the three arduous years of law school. I would also like to thank Professor Wilbur
Leatherberry not only for his assistance in shaping this note, but also for his teachings of the
difficult and sometimes confusing subject of insurance law in the classroom.
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APPENDIX
Uninsured Motorist Statutes
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AL ALA. CODE § 32-7-23 (1999)
AK ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.020 (Michie 2004)
AZ ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01 (West Supp. 2004)
AR ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-89-403 (Michie Supp. 2003)
CA CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp. 2004)
CO COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-609 (West 2004)
CT CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38A-336 (West 2000)
DE DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3902 (1999)
FL FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727 (West Supp. 2005)
GA GA. CODE. ANN. § 33-7-11 (Supp. 2004)
HI HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:1OC-301 (Michie Supp. 2003)
ID IDAHO CODE § 41-2502 (Michie 2003)
IL 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/143A (West Supp. 2004)
IN IND. CODE ANN. § 27-7-5-2 (West 2003)
IA IOWA CODE ANN. § 516A. I (West 2003)
KS KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284 (2000)
KY KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.20-020 (Banks-Baldwin 2001)
LA LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1406 (West 2004)
ME ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2902 (West Supp. 2004)
MD MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-509 (2002)
MA MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 1 13L (West 1998)
MI 1972 MICH. PUB. ACTS 345 (repealed 1973)
MN MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.49 (West Supp. 2005)
MS MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101 (1999)
MO MO. ANN. STAT. § 379.203 (West 2002)
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MT MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-23-201 (2004)
NE NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-6408 (Michie 1998)
NV NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 690B.020 (Michie 2003)
NH N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:15:00 (2004)
NJ N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (West Supp. 2004)
NM N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301 (Michie 2001)
NY N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420 (McKinney Supp. 2004)
NC N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (2003)
ND N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.2 (Supp. 2003)
OH OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (West Supp.. 2003)
OK OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3636 (West Supp. 2005)
OR OR. REV. STAT. § 742.502 (2003)
PA PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2000 (West 1999)
RI R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.1 (2002)
SC S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-150 (Law. Co-op. 2002)
SD S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11-9 (Michie 2000)
TN TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1201 (2000)
TX TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.06-1 (Vernon 2002)
UT UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-302 (2003)
VT VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 941 (1999)
VA VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Michie Supp. 2004)
WA WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.22.030 (West Supp.
2005)
WV W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31 (Michie 2003)
WI WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.32 (West 2004)
WY WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-10-101 (Michie 2003)
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